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SoutheaSt aSia: 
SourceS of regime Support
Alex Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Bridget Welsh
Alex Chang is assistant research fellow at the Institute of Political 
Science at Academia Sinica (Taipei). Yun-han Chu is Distinguished 
Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Si-
nica and professor of political science at National Taiwan University. 
Bridget Welsh is associate professor of political science at Singapore 
Management University. 
The concept of regime legitimacy is central to understanding modern 
political life. All modern political regimes depend on the public’s will-
ing acquiescence and support in order to survive and function well. As 
Bruce Gilley has persuasively argued, regimes that lack legitimacy must 
devote more resources to maintaining their rule and fewer to effective 
governance, thereby reducing support and making them vulnerable to 
overthrow or collapse.1 Although it may seem counterintuitive, all sorts 
of regimes may benefit from some measure of popular support, not just 
democracies—a fact often overlooked by theories that focus exclusively 
on democratization.2 In this essay, we use the latest wave of the Asian 
Barometer Survey (ABS) to identify the sources of regime support in 
Southeast Asia within a comprehensive framework that takes into ac-
count ongoing theoretical debates as well as the regional context.3
Normative political theory typically expects democratic regimes to 
enjoy greater popular legitimacy than do authoritarian regimes because 
democracy is built on the consent of the governed and universal suf-
frage. Yet ample survey data have shown that diffuse popular support 
for the regime varies considerably across democracies, and the observed 
level of regime legitimacy in nondemocratic regimes is sometimes con-
siderably higher than in emerging democracies.4 Recent efforts to under-
stand these puzzling data have yielded two different explanations.
The first suggests that regime legitimacy is more likely to be created, 
maintained, and destroyed on the output side of the political system than 
on the input side.5 Nondemocratic regimes may enjoy a high level of 
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political support—even while denying rights to the people—if such re-
gimes can deliver economic well-being and good governance.6 By the 
same token, mechanisms of popular accountability and democratic rep-
resentation do not immunize democracies against poor economic perfor-
mance and bad governance.
The second explanation suggests that regime legitimacy stems not 
just from the effectiveness of the political system but also from the pre-
vailing political predisposition of the public. Perhaps the contentious 
character of democratic politics nurtures “critical citizens” who are less 
satisfied with their regimes than people living in nondemocracies.7 It 
is also conceivable that some nondemocratic regimes enjoy a higher 
level of political support due to two basic conditions: First, with the 
opposition and independent media effectively suppressed and all politi-
cal space occupied by the state, viable political alternatives are lacking 
in nondemocracies. Second, the bulk of the populace in authoritarian 
countries is uncritical, deferential, and compliant. In this sense, political 
culture matters, and legitimacy is in the eyes of the beholders.
Our analysis rigorously and empirically tests these alternative ex-
planations. Southeast Asia—home to a wide range of political regimes, 
from one-party authoritarian systems to liberal democracies—provides 
an important testing ground. Our findings strongly support the argument 
that regular and competitive elections in and of themselves do not serve 
as the main pillar for creating and sustaining legitimacy in emerging 
democracies. Moreover, our data show that political legitimacy in these 
countries depends at least as much on the quality of governance as on 
the provision of material goods. 
In addition, our empirical findings register an important qualification 
to the prevailing view that the resiliency of Southeast Asian nondem-
ocratic regimes results primarily from their superior ability to deliver 
economic prosperity. Regime support in these countries stems less from 
economic performance and more from citizens’ perceptions that the 
government is responsive to their needs, effective at controlling corrup-
tion, and fair and equal in its treatment of ordinary people. Furthermore, 
ideology and culture are also important sources for the legitimacy of 
nondemocratic regimes, which bolster their popular support by cultivat-
ing nationalism and national identity. These regimes also benefit from 
being rooted in hospitable cultural soil where traditional social and po-
litical values still enjoy strong support. Although popular political con-
victions matter to all types of regimes in the region, this is more strongly 
the case in nondemocracies than in democracies.
Over the last two decades, Southeast Asia has seen a number of re-
gime transformations, though they have not all been in step with the 
global march toward democracy. During the period typically referred to 
as the “third wave” of democratization, only two countries in the region, 
the Philippines and Thailand, became democracies. By the mid-1990s, 
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most of the region was still governed by various forms of nondemocracy. 
Indonesia embarked on the path to democracy in 1998, a year after the 
Asian financial crisis that led to the downfall of the Suharto dictatorship. 
Yet the financial crisis did not spark such dramatic change elsewhere 
in the region, as authoritarian systems with greater resiliency, including 
those of Malaysia and Singapore, weathered calls for reform.
Although democracy had made greater inroads in Southeast Asia by 
the dawn of the twenty-first century, many governments in the region 
faced debilitating challenges, including political polarization, elite in-
fighting, partisan gridlock, and corruption scandals. The first decade of 
the new century also saw worrisome signs of authoritarian backsliding, 
beginning in 2004 with the crackdown on dissent and consolidation of 
power by Cambodian strongman Hun Sen and a fraudulent presiden-
tial election in the Philippines, and continuing with the 2006 military 
coup and 2008 judicial coup in Thailand. In addition, China’s robust 
economic success, replicated in Vietnam, served to reinforce the appeal 
of an authoritarian Asian model based on one-party rule. Even as new 
democracies such as Indonesia’s became more consolidated, concerns 
about eroding political freedoms and entrenched elite rule grew.
Now, however, the authoritarian tide appears to be ebbing once 
again. Thailand and the Philippines held free and fair elections in 2010 
and 2011, respectively. In both countries, democracy withstood grave 
challenges and arguably grew stronger. Recent elections in Malaysia 
(2008) and Singapore (2011) have also been more competitive, as these 
electoral authoritarian regimes now face greater internal challenges than 
in years past. Democratic forces in both countries are making headway. 
Civil society is expanding and elections are becoming more meaningful, 
gains that are tied in part to rising inequality, persistent concerns about 
corruption, ineffective public consultations, generational turnover, and 
shifting values. 
Even the most authoritarian outposts have seen democratic openings. 
In 2011, Burma’s long-ruling military junta at last began responding 
to intense domestic and international pressure for democratic reforms. 
In Vietnam, the exposure of corruption scandals in the country’s state-
owned firms has for the first time led the Communist government to 
engage the people, though the scope of this effort remains narrow. 
Despite significant democratic advances in Southeast Asia, however, 
authoritarian forces remain entrenched in the region: Regime hard-lin-
ers in Malaysia and Vietnam, for example, fan nationalistic fervor and 
ethnic tensions in order to hold on to power, and rights violations (the 
suppression of free expression, free assembly, and religious freedom, 
among others) remain serious. The threats to freedom increasingly come 
from nonstate actors as well—as illustrated by the 2011 attacks on reli-
gious freedom in Indonesia—a circumstance which broadens the scope 
of challenges that the region’s democracies must face.
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Meanwhile, information and communication technologies are pro-
viding opportunities for democratic activists while at the same time 
creating new difficulties. In recent years, the Internet and social media 
have provided alternative sources of information, lowered the cost of 
political participation, and increased the mobilizing capacity of opposi-
tion forces. In addition, conflicts are taking place more and more online 
nowadays, and bloggers are often the front-line combatants. 
In short, while there has been democratic expansion in Southeast 
Asia, serious obstacles remain. It is in this context that we systemati-
cally examine levels of regime support and the underlying factors that 
explain regime legitimacy in seven Southeast Asian countries—Cam-
bodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam—using data collected in the second and third waves of the 
ABS, conducted in 2005–2007 and 2010–2012, respectively.
These seven countries represent a wide range of regimes. Accord-
ing to Larry Diamond’s regime-classification scheme presented in these 
pages in his April 2002 essay “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking 
About Hybrid Regimes,” Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand in 
2010 all qualified as electoral democracies—regimes in which free and 
fair elections are institutionalized, but political and legal obstacles to 
rights and freedoms remain significant. Malaysia that same year ranked 
among the competitive authoritarian regimes—those in which the free-
dom, fairness, inclusiveness, and meaningfulness of elections were 
greatly compromised, but significant parliamentary opposition existed. 
Singapore and Cambodia, meanwhile, fell into the noncompetitive (he-
gemonic) authoritarian category—regimes dominated by a hegemonic 
ruling party. Finally, Vietnam was a typical one-party authoritarian re-
gime—that is, the space for political contestation is completely closed, 
and the Communist Party continues to monopolize politics. This diver-
sity of cases within a single region allows us to compare the factors 
underlying regime support across the four distinctive regime types that 
today account for the bulk of political systems not only in Southeast 
Asia, but throughout the developing world.8
A Comprehensive Analytical Framework
In the context of Southeast Asia, alternative sources for creating and 
maintaining regime legitimacy can be grouped together under four dif-
ferent rubrics—government performance, good governance, democratic 
development, and values and ideology (which here does not include 
democratic values and ideology). These categories are listed in Table 1 
below, along with the specific indicators that compose them.9
Government performance. In Southeast Asia, regime legitimacy has 
always been tied to the output of governments, including economic per-
formance, public-service delivery, the enforcement of law and order, 
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and the government’s overall responsiveness to the people’s needs. In 
other words, regime legitimacy depends on what governments do. 
They are judged above all on their effectiveness at delivering jobs, 
prosperity, and price stability. Some Southeast Asian regimes are ad-
mired for their robust economic performance, as exemplified by the de-
velopment-oriented states of Singapore and Malaysia from the 1960s to 
the 1980s. Indeed, people in Southeast Asia have traditionally equated 
development-oriented strongman leaders such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan 
Yew and Indonesia’s Suharto with their respective regimes. By contrast, 
economic crises and mismanagement can destabilize regimes, as hap-
pened in Indonesia in 1998. Also important is the provision of public 
services, along with public safety and crime control. Finally, citizens 
evaluate regimes on their overall responsiveness to citizen demands and 
their capacity to address the problems that people care about most. 
We expect the factors identified under the rubric of government per-
formance to be extremely powerful explanations for regime support 
across the region, and more so in authoritarian systems than in electoral 
democracies.
Good governance. In Southeast Asia, it is increasingly unlikely that 
political regimes can win over their citizens merely by delivering tan-
gible goods; people also want their governments to exhibit integrity. 
Recent studies have shown that one of the most important factors shap-
ing East Asians’ perceptions of regimes is corruption.10 From the cor-
ruption charges levied against Thailand’s former premier Thaksin Shi-
nawatra and former Filipino president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the 
cries of cronyism in Malaysia and Indonesia, corruption has been a focal 
point for popular discontent. In addition to honesty (in the sense of offi-
cials eschewing gross corruption), people place a high value on the rule 
of law and mechanisms of horizontal accountability (which typically 
Rubric Indicators
Government Performance
Condition of national economy
Access to public services
Safety and crime control
Government responsiveness
Good Governance
Controlling corruption
Rule of law
Horizontal accountability
Fair and equal treatment
Democratic Development
Freedom
Popular (electoral) accountability
Political competition
Perceived democratic progress
Values and Ideology
Political traditionalism
Social traditionalism
Nationalism
Table 1—explanaTions of Regime suppoRT
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means effective checks placed on executive power by judges and legis-
lators). These desired arrangements establish a self-restraining state and 
minimize the abuses of power to which officeholders are prone.
 Socioeconomic equality and fair treatment by the state are also es-
sential to regime legitimacy, especially in the eyes of disadvantaged 
groups as well as racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. As disparities 
widen across the region, due in part to well-connected elites lining their 
own pockets, the ability of governments to redress economic exclusion 
is especially salient. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that democratically elected govern-
ments will have greater integrity or be better able to meet key good-
governance indicators than nondemocratic governments. According to 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, Singapore and 
Malaysia are much better at controlling corruption and upholding the 
rule of law than are Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.11 Popular 
assessments of good governance may also play a role in explaining why 
nondemocratic regimes sometimes enjoy higher levels of political sup-
port than do democracies.
Democratic development. Although democracy has yet to become 
the “only game in town” in every corner of Southeast Asia, it is increas-
ingly hard for regimes of any type to gain and exert political authority 
without at least some of the standard institutional trappings of represen-
tative democracy. These include regular elections, multiparty competi-
tion, independent media, and freedom of expression and association. 
Why must even nondemocratic regimes apply such democratic “win-
dow dressing”? First, few if any Southeast Asian regimes will be able to 
defy the transformative forces of modernization in the long run. Mod-
ernization theory holds that resistance to democratic change will be-
come increasingly untenable.12 Rising levels of economic development 
necessarily lead to growing mass demands for liberalization in authori-
tarian societies and for higher levels of mass participation in societies 
that are already democratic. Second, as most Southeast Asian societies 
are now enmeshed in the global economy and the international com-
munity, they are also more open than ever to external pressures and 
criticism. Regimes that openly reject the formal institutions of represen-
tation, popular accountability, and expression suffer a substantial loss of 
external legitimacy in the contemporary global ideological arena. 
With the exception of Vietnam, all Southeast Asian regimes covered 
by the ABS formally commit themselves to the principle of popular 
accountability and open political contestation. In competitive authori-
tarian systems (Malaysia) and hegemonic authoritarian regimes (Sin-
gapore), incumbents may routinely manipulate formal democratic rules 
and effectively deny the opposition a level playing field, but they can-
not eliminate opposition forces entirely or even reduce them to sham 
parties. Regimes that fulfill citizens’ aspirations for protection of ba-
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sic freedoms, popular accountability, fair and open political contesta-
tion, and overall democratic progress are likely to enjoy higher levels of 
popular support. These evaluations are particularly important in young 
democracies, which are expected to meet core democratic standards.
Values and ideology. In the 1990s, the debate about “Asian values” 
and their impact on the popular understanding of politics in East Asia 
took center stage in international discussions about democratization in 
the region. Are Asian values—which are said to stress political order 
and authority and to favor collective rather than individualistic views 
regarding families, groups, and work units—incompatible with democ-
racy? 
Asian values have been explicitly linked to popular support for non-
democratic regimes in the region. The ABS survey examines two differ-
ent dimensions of Asian values: 1) social traditionalism, which encom-
passes traditional family, interpersonal, and work-related values and 
ethics; and 2) authoritarian values, which embrace support for paternal-
istic political authority and a “harmonious” social order.13 In addition, 
we look at patriotism in order to see whether regimes gain support by 
promoting nationalism and national identity. This is an important con-
sideration, as many Southeast Asian regimes earned their right to rule, at 
least initially, on the basis of their credentials as leaders of anticolonial 
and national-independence struggles.
Finally, our measurement of regime support consists of two compo-
nents: The first is support for regime institutions, a crucial element of 
regime legitimacy,14 which we measure according to the degree of trust 
in the actual institutions of government (the executive, parliament, the 
judiciary, the military, and the like). In our analysis, the level of support 
for regime institutions is calculated by averaging the degree of trust in 
the various institutions so that this measure is not tied to trust in a spe-
cific body or bodies, but rather indicates trust in the system as a whole. 
The second component is diffuse regime support, as defined by David 
Easton.15 The third-wave ABS questionnaire designed a series of ques-
tions asking respondents about their allegiance to, preference for, and 
pride and confidence in their own respective systems of government. 
The ABS has made a point of guiding respondents to differentiate the 
system of government from the specific government in office or its per-
formance.16 This specially designed battery of questions is not tied to the 
concept of democratic legitimacy and thus enables us to make a system-
atic comparison of levels of legitimacy across different regime types.
Through this analytical framework, we are able to ask three impor-
tant sets of questions. First, what are the levels of regime support in 
Southeast Asia, and do they vary across regime types and over time? 
Second, what are the common factors that explain regime support across 
Southeast Asia, and what do they tell us about how people in the region 
view their systems of government? Do values and ideology, for exam-
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ple, explain regime support more than do quality of governance or level 
of democratic development? Alternatively, does economic performance 
trump other factors? These questions address the core debates on the 
role of values versus economic performance in shaping perceptions of 
regimes in the region. Third, are the reasons for popular regime support 
different in different types of regimes? Do democratic regimes draw 
their legitimacy from different sources than do authoritarian regimes? 
These three questions—the level of regime support, the common un-
derlying factors of regime support across regime types, and the differ-
ent underlying factors in different regime types—help us to understand 
regime legitimacy in Southeast Asia.
Level of Support for Regime Institutions
The last two waves of the ABS survey found that all regimes in 
Southeast Asia except for the Philippines enjoyed considerable overall 
citizen trust in their institutions. The Figure above shows that, on a scale 
from 0 to 3, most regimes received an average score of more than 1.5 
in both waves, indicating that a majority of citizens placed consider-
able trust in the actual institutions of government. Strikingly, however, 
the authoritarian countries enjoy higher levels of institutional support 
than do the democratic ones. Vietnam—a one-party authoritarian re-
gime—registered the highest level of support in both waves, while the 
Philippines—an electoral democracy—registered the lowest. Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Cambodia consistently outperformed the three electoral 
democracies—the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia—by a signifi-
cant margin. The former group averaged 2.2 over the two waves, while 
the latter averaged 1.7 in the second wave (2005–2007) and 1.6 in the 
figuRe—Changes in suppoRT foR Regime insTiTuTions
beTween abs wave ii (2005–2007) and iii (2010–2012)
1.35 
1.85 
1.75 
1.92 
2.16 
1.86 
2.58 
1.43 
1.72 1.7 
2.08 2.03 2.08 
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0
0.5
1
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2
2.5
3
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third (2010–12). The third wave of ABS data reveals a similar pattern 
across different regime types on the diffuse-regime-support measure-
ment.17
As the Figure shows, popular support for regime institutions has not 
fluctuated significantly over time. Most changes are around a magnitude 
of 0.2. Upon closer scrutiny, however, one can still detect some margin-
al but meaningful changes in the level of support over the last few years 
in several of the surveyed countries. These changes are largely linked to 
major sociopolitical developments. 
In the Philippines, for instance, popular support for regime institu-
tions has rebounded from the low experienced during the Arroyo presi-
dency (2001–10) and has continued to climb since the free and fair 2010 
election and the inauguration of a more consultative president, Benigno 
S. Aquino III. Visible strides on several key policy matters (economic 
growth, antipoverty efforts, reduction of factional violence, and the like) 
have helped as well. 
In Thailand, by contrast, the overall level of institutional trust dipped 
during the tumultuous years from 2006 through 2010, which saw a mili-
tary coup, judicial interference in the electoral process, and moves to 
limit Internet freedom. During this period, polarization of the electorate 
between the red-shirted backers of ousted premier Thaksin Shinawa-
tra and their yellow-shirted adversaries turned increasingly violent and 
eventually resulted in the May 2010 military crackdown and killings 
of red-shirt protestors. In Indonesia, meanwhile, even as the country’s 
democratic transition has widened the space for civil society in general, 
the government struggles to control corruption and guarantee freedom 
of the press and religion.
In Cambodia, popular support for regime institutions grew between 
2008 and 2012, as Hun Sen, taking advantage of a weak and increasingly 
divided opposition and his own party’s ability to dole out patronage in 
the countryside, consolidated his position during a period of strong eco-
nomic growth. In Vietnam, citizens’ exceptionally high level of support 
for regime institutions began to show signs of weakening between 2007 
and 2011 as the country’s economic momentum waned, income inequal-
ity began to widen, corruption persisted, and scandals erupted frequently. 
Singapore’s dip in support for regime institutions in the third wave 
stems from socioeconomic, immigration, and other challenges that the 
regime has faced in recent years. In response, the government has had to 
loosen its grip on civil society and respect Internet freedom, while also 
addressing the growing popular backlash against the massive influx of 
new immigrants, which has “diluted” the uniqueness of being Singapor-
ean and put added pressure on public services.
To summarize, then, support for regime institutions in the Philippines 
is the lowest among the surveyed countries, but is on the rise. In Indo-
nesia, a steady majority supports regime institutions. In Malaysia, as the 
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opposition has forced a political opening and gained electoral strength, 
people are embracing what is now a more pluralistic system and support 
for regime institutions has shot up. Even in Cambodia, where there has 
been a slight increase in support for regime institutions, the electorate is 
divided in its support for Hun Sen’s government. Meanwhile, the seem-
ingly higher level of support for regime institutions under authoritarian 
systems is no longer as robust as it once was. In Singapore and Vietnam, 
third-wave levels of institutional support have dipped slightly from their 
first-wave levels. 
There is no question that the exceptionally high level of support 
for regime institutions observed in the more authoritarian systems has 
something to do with the latters’ relative freedom from independent me-
dia scrutiny and the lack of genuine political opposition. On the other 
hand, it would be an oversimplification to assume that these systems 
enjoy higher levels of political support simply because they are authori-
tarian. We need to dig deeper into the underlying factors that account 
for the varying levels of regime legitimacy, both within a given political 
system and across different types of regimes.
Sources of Regime Legitimacy
Table 2 above shows the relative explanatory power of various sourc-
es of regime support in the region as a whole, as well as for each of the 
seven countries.18 Across the region’s political systems, there is a strik-
Nationalism 0.09 - 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.14
Social Traditionalism 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.09
Political Traditionalism 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.13
Political Competition 0.10 0.06 - 0.10 0.15 - 0.14 0.12
Horizontal Accountability 0.09 - 0.15 0.14 0.10 - 0.07 0.16
Equal Treatment 0.14 0.15 - 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.08
Rule of Law 0.11 0.08 - 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.13
Controlling Corruption 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.19 0.19
Government Responsiveness 0.16 0.14 0.28 0.22 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.12
Access to Services 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.16 -
Economic Performance 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.08
Note: All numbers are standardized regression coefficients. Those equal to or greater than 
0.15 are boldfaced to highlight the more significant explanatory variables.
Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Wave III.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
Thailand
Indonesia
M
alaysia
Singapore
Cambodia
Vietnam
Table 2—CompaRaTive explanaToRy sTRengTh of 
souRCes of Regime suppoRT
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ing commonality in terms of underlying factors for sustaining regime le-
gitimacy. Of the fifteen indicators that had been identified in Table 1 on 
page 154, eleven turned out to be statistically significant when it comes 
to explaining the level of regime sup-
port across the region. These are the 
eleven indicators in Table 2 on page 
159, and they cluster around three 
categories: values and ideology, 
good governance, and government 
performance. 
The pattern is similar across re-
gime types. First, all statistically 
significant indicators in all seven 
countries exert their influence in the 
same direction—that is, strengthen-
ing rather than weakening regime le-
gitimacy. Second, most of the eleven 
indicators that are statistically significant at the regional level also turn 
out to be important sources of regime legitimacy at the country level, 
although the explanatory strength of each indicator varies across coun-
tries. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia, all eleven indicators are 
statistically significant (at a 0.05 probability level); in the Philippines 
and Vietnam, ten are statistically significant; in Singapore, nine; in Thai-
land, eight. In the case of Singapore, because the political-competition 
indicator is not statistically significant, we can conclude that a perceived 
lack of open and free political contestation has little impact on regime 
legitimacy. In fact, many of our Singaporean respondents recognized 
that the opposition was denied a level playing field, but did not consider 
this to be as important as other factors.
All three aspects of government performance—namely, the condi-
tion of the national economy, the government’s perceived responsive-
ness to people’s needs, and access to public services—are important 
sources of regime legitimacy. Collectively, they exert more explanato-
ry power than any other category of explanatory variable for all South-
east Asian regimes except Singapore’s. Economic performance and 
governmental responsiveness are two of the most important reasons 
for differences in the level of political support among citizens of the 
electoral democracies (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and 
the one competitive authoritarian regime (Malaysia). The influence of 
partisanship, of course, shades electorates’ views on these indicators, 
making them much more diverse and divergent than the views of those 
who live under hegemonic authoritarian regimes such as those found 
in Singapore and Cambodia.
Most indicators under the rubric of good governance are also 
important pillars for sustaining regime legitimacy across all politi-
The more a Singaporean 
subscribes to nationalism, 
patriotism, traditional 
political values, and tradi-
tional social values, or any 
combination thereof, the 
more likely he or she will 
be to embrace the existing 
political system.
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cal systems. The collective explanatory power of these indicators is 
almost on par with that of government-performance indicators. In 
particular, corruption control and equal treatment are consistently 
among the top explanatory variables across the region. In the Philip-
pines and Malaysia, they are the top two explanatory variables after 
economic performance. Across regime types, people who believed 
that their regime was providing basic necessities to all people and 
treating everyone fairly and equally regardless of wealth, status, or 
ethnicity supported their regime more strongly. Given the growing 
socioeconomic inequality in the region, this issue is not surprisingly 
becoming a major concern. 
In the case of Malaysia, closer scrutiny of our data shows that ethnic 
minorities tend to hold more critical views of the regime on the issue 
of fair and equal treatment than do most Malays (the dominant majority 
in the country), and these minority groups likewise show less support 
for the regime. Popular perceptions regarding the government’s com-
mitment to the rule of law and success at corruption control are key 
factors in determining regime support among the citizens of Cambodia 
and Vietnam. 
The three indicators under the rubric of values and ideology—nation-
alism, social traditionalism, and political traditionalism—perform rath-
er differently than the previous two categories of explanatory variables. 
Collectively, they exert much less explanatory power in the region as 
a whole than either government performance or good governance. Yet 
in the case of Singapore, the three predispositions together form the 
most important pillar of regime legitimacy. Their collective explanatory 
power trumps both government performance and good governance. The 
more a Singaporean subscribes to nationalism, patriotism, traditional 
political values, and traditional social values, or any combination there-
of, the more likely he or she will be to embrace the existing political 
system. This explains why the incumbent elite in Singapore has been so 
preoccupied with constructing a public discourse of national pride and 
Asian values. The variant pattern of regime support in Singapore also 
helps us to understand the country’s “exceptionalism,” as the regime has 
relied on a combination of values and national identity rather than only 
economic prosperity to buttress its position as an authoritarian outlier 
among higher-income countries.
Nationalism is also an important pillar of regime legitimacy for the 
Vietnamese one-party regime, which benefits from its roots in the anti-
imperialist struggle and its success at reunifying the country after a bitter 
war. Our data also show that the prevalence of traditional political values 
in the three Southeast Asian societies that are less developed—Cambo-
dia, Indonesia, and Vietnam—tends to load the dice in favor of the exist-
ing political regime regardless of its level of democratic development.
To our surprise, under the rubric of democratic development, only po-
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litical competition—that is, whether electoral contestation is perceived 
to be open and fair—has any bearing on the level of regime legitimacy. 
The remaining three indicators—freedom, popular (electoral) account-
ability, and perceived democratic progress over the last decade—are not 
statistically significant in explaining 
the level of regime support across the 
region or in most of the seven sur-
veyed countries.19 This is a sobering 
observation for emerging democra-
cies. It suggests that, all else being 
equal, putting in place the basics of 
representative democracy will not 
bring a regime any significant ad-
vantage in popular support above 
and beyond what a nondemocratic 
regime could expect to glean.
Our empirical analysis shows 
both commonalities and variations 
in the sources of regime support in Southeast Asian countries. Most 
regimes in the region draw political legitimacy from perceptions that 
their governance is effective and marked by integrity. These find-
ings lend support to the argument that regime legitimacy—when it is 
won and when it is lost—is rooted in the output side of the political 
system. 
Yet delivering economic prosperity alone will not suffice. In or-
der for political regimes in Southeast Asia to win over their people, 
they must control corruption, respect the rule of law, treat all citizens 
fairly and equally, expand public services, and be responsive to what 
the people need. The region’s young democracies are not exempt from 
these requirements. In the case of the Philippines, which scored the 
lowest on our regime-legitimacy index, the system consistently failed 
to live up to these expectations, at least until the most recent presi-
dential cycle.
The strong tie between regime support and good-governance in-
dicators such as corruption control and fair and equal treatment puts 
pressure on Southeast Asian governments to address these issues more 
effectively. Corruption has always been a serious problem in the re-
gion, and most countries are still failing to handle it adequately. Like-
wise, as governments grapple with how to manage growing social dis-
parities, socioeconomic equality and fair treatment remain elusive for 
many Southeast Asians. At some point, these problems could threaten 
to undermine regime support.
Finally, our analysis reveals a correlation between regime type and 
sources of legitimacy. Nationalism and traditional values continue to be 
important for one-party systems and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. 
The strong tie between 
regime support and good-
governance indicators such 
as corruption control and 
fair and equal treatment 
puts pressure on South-
east Asian governments to 
address these issues more 
effectively.
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Southeast Asia’s authoritarian regimes depend for their legitimacy and 
resiliency on their ability to keep up their remarkable records of sup-
pressing political contestation and cultivating nondemocratic convic-
tions and values among their citizens. Yet these very tools also make 
nondemocratic regimes in the region increasingly vulnerable, as the 
popular forces unleashed by the revolution in information and commu-
nications technologies threaten to weaken the influence of traditional 
values.
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